This article is the first English translation of Gadamer's early essay “On the Idea of a System in Philosophy” (“Zur Systemidee in der Philosophie”) from 1924. Influenced by Marburg Neo-Kantianism and Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology, Gadamer is concerned with the problems that arise with the idea of systematicity in philosophy. In particular, he focuses on conceiving of an idea of a system that does justice to the historical variability of philosophical thoughts. He shows that systematicity and history are, in fact, not (...) in tension but deeply intertwined because of the foundation philosophy has in factical and historical human life. Gadamer, therefore, already anticipates some of the most characteristic ideas of his later magnum opus Truth and Method. The translator's Introduction contextualises this essay in both its relation to Marburg Neo-Kantians and Heidegger's thought, highlights the most significant continuities to Gadamer's mature philosophy, and provides an overview of the essay's main arguments. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Search for Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" in the Philosophy of John DeweyFrank X. RyanJames A. Good A Search for Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" in the Philosophy of John Dewey Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006. xxx + 288 pp.Among the revelations of Dewey's rare moments of autobiographical reflection, none has generated more curiosity and investigative zeal than his 1930 claim to have (...) "drifted" from Hegel in the decade following his move from Michigan to Chicago in 1894. Beginning with Morton White's Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism (1943), biographers have divided on the question of whether Dewey's later philosophy was more strongly influenced by William James's experimental psychology or F. J. E. Woodbridge's Aristotelian naturalism. Despite their differences, both approaches are essentially empirical and realistic, and thus the majority of sympathetic commentators have agreed that Dewey was a realist, albeit of a decidedly unorthodox stripe. For them the notion that Dewey retained any significant commitment to idealism, given its virtual eradication at the beginning of the twentieth century, would damage his influence and legacy.It has been something of a puzzle, accordingly, that in the same autobiographical essay Dewey alludes to a "permanent Hegelian deposit." For years Richard Rorty has claimed this differentiates a "good" Dewey committed to "social flourishing" from a "bad" Dewey prone to metaphysical dalliance. But the first systematic inquiry into Dewey's enduring Hegelianism is John R. Shook's Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality (2000). Shook argues convincingly that Dewey never abandoned idealism, but rather transformed it into an experimental naturalism by doing away with both "mind-stuff" and equally noxious "things-in-themselves." In many ways James Good's A Search for Unity in Diversity is a bookend to Shook's project, though Good further differentiates Anglo-American Neo-Hegelianism from Hegel himself. According to Good, Dewey endorsed a Humanistic/Historicist interpretation of Hegel rooted in the reciprocal engagement of individuals and societies, rather than the supernatural and architectonic absolute championed by Neo-Hegelians such as T. H. Green, and F. H. Bradley. With [End Page 216] top-notch scholarship and scrupulous attention to detail, A Search for Unity in Diversity is both an excellent intellectual biography and a penetrating plea for a radical reinterpretation of Dewey's contribution to philosophy. I'll briefly sketch the historical account before addressing the more controversial claims about the "permanent Hegelian deposit."Even readers familiar with the half-dozen book-length treatments of Dewey's development will find this account refreshing and informative. Good's professional credentials as a historian shine as he recreates the rough and bustling Burlington of Dewey's youth. In the 1870s, German idealism was considered the epitome of political liberalism and progressive education, and Dewey's journey toward the "inclusive philosophical idea" of the social began in an environment swirling with the crosscurrents of Kant, Hegel, and Schelling. At the White Street Congregational Church, Lewis Barstow preached a liberal orthodoxy that was essentially "man-building" (102), and Good presents a convincing case for the likelihood that even in boyhood Dewey never viewed God as an aloof law-giver or cosmic architect, but as a process unifying the individual and the social within a natural world of unlimited potential. At the University of Vermont Dewey encountered a struggling rural college transformed into the first bastion of American transcendentalism by James Marsh, who inspired a "Burlington philosophy" that rejected atomistic empiricism for a holistic integrity of knowing and doing, facts and values, and pure and practical reasons (57–59).In noting the influence of the "St. Louis Hegelians" upon Dewey, most biographers have focused on W. T. Harris, the prominent founder of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy who published Dewey's earliest submissions and offered encouragement that led to his pursuit of graduate work at Johns Hopkins. Good augments this familiar tale with fascinating depictions of equally influential yet lesser-known Hegelians such as H. C. Brokmeyer, Denton Snider, and Thomas Davidson. At a time when European Hegelianism was polarized between, on the one hand, reactionary apologists for traditional Christianity and Prussian militarism and, on the other, radical... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Search for Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" in the Philosophy of John DeweyFrank X. RyanJames A. Good A Search for Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" in the Philosophy of John Dewey Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006. xxx + 288 pp.Among the revelations of Dewey's rare moments of autobiographical reflection, none has generated more curiosity and investigative zeal than his 1930 claim to have (...) "drifted" from Hegel in the decade following his move from Michigan to Chicago in 1894. Beginning with Morton White's Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism (1943), biographers have divided on the question of whether Dewey's later philosophy was more strongly influenced by William James's experimental psychology or F. J. E. Woodbridge's Aristotelian naturalism. Despite their differences, both approaches are essentially empirical and realistic, and thus the majority of sympathetic commentators have agreed that Dewey was a realist, albeit of a decidedly unorthodox stripe. For them the notion that Dewey retained any significant commitment to idealism, given its virtual eradication at the beginning of the twentieth century, would damage his influence and legacy.It has been something of a puzzle, accordingly, that in the same autobiographical essay Dewey alludes to a "permanent Hegelian deposit." For years Richard Rorty has claimed this differentiates a "good" Dewey committed to "social flourishing" from a "bad" Dewey prone to metaphysical dalliance. But the first systematic inquiry into Dewey's enduring Hegelianism is John R. Shook's Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality (2000). Shook argues convincingly that Dewey never abandoned idealism, but rather transformed it into an experimental naturalism by doing away with both "mind-stuff" and equally noxious "things-in-themselves." In many ways James Good's A Search for Unity in Diversity is a bookend to Shook's project, though Good further differentiates Anglo-American Neo-Hegelianism from Hegel himself. According to Good, Dewey endorsed a Humanistic/Historicist interpretation of Hegel rooted in the reciprocal engagement of individuals and societies, rather than the supernatural and architectonic absolute championed by Neo-Hegelians such as T. H. Green, and F. H. Bradley. With [End Page 216] top-notch scholarship and scrupulous attention to detail, A Search for Unity in Diversity is both an excellent intellectual biography and a penetrating plea for a radical reinterpretation of Dewey's contribution to philosophy. I'll briefly sketch the historical account before addressing the more controversial claims about the "permanent Hegelian deposit."Even readers familiar with the half-dozen book-length treatments of Dewey's development will find this account refreshing and informative. Good's professional credentials as a historian shine as he recreates the rough and bustling Burlington of Dewey's youth. In the 1870s, German idealism was considered the epitome of political liberalism and progressive education, and Dewey's journey toward the "inclusive philosophical idea" of the social began in an environment swirling with the crosscurrents of Kant, Hegel, and Schelling. At the White Street Congregational Church, Lewis Barstow preached a liberal orthodoxy that was essentially "man-building" (102), and Good presents a convincing case for the likelihood that even in boyhood Dewey never viewed God as an aloof law-giver or cosmic architect, but as a process unifying the individual and the social within a natural world of unlimited potential. At the University of Vermont Dewey encountered a struggling rural college transformed into the first bastion of American transcendentalism by James Marsh, who inspired a "Burlington philosophy" that rejected atomistic empiricism for a holistic integrity of knowing and doing, facts and values, and pure and practical reasons (57–59).In noting the influence of the "St. Louis Hegelians" upon Dewey, most biographers have focused on W. T. Harris, the prominent founder of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy who published Dewey's earliest submissions and offered encouragement that led to his pursuit of graduate work at Johns Hopkins. Good augments this familiar tale with fascinating depictions of equally influential yet lesser-known Hegelians such as H. C. Brokmeyer, Denton Snider, and Thomas Davidson. At a time when European Hegelianism was polarized between, on the one hand, reactionary apologists for traditional Christianity and Prussian militarism and, on the other, radical... (shrink)

This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance and corporate sustainability performance in the emerging Asian markets where the central role of sustainable development was perceived after the 2008 global financial crisis. We base our study on the triple bottom line approach that incorporates three dimensions of sustainability: economic, environmental, and social performance. A governance index comprising ten firm-specific provisions is proposed to summarise internal corporate governance. Consistent with agency theory, we confirm that firms with better corporate governance have better (...) corporate sustainability performance. We also determine which main factors drive the governance-sustainability relation. The findings have practical implications for firms, shareholders, and policy makers by emphasising the role of corporate governance in assessing and enhancing corporate sustainability performance. (shrink)

Using data on submitted and published manuscripts in Feminist Economics from 1995 to 2019, we examine differences in method and scope used by authors residing in the Global North and Global South. We specifically focus on research methods, intersectional analyses, region of analysis, and co-authorship status. Further, using logistic regression models, we examine the relationship between authors’ location and use of research methods. We find authors in the Global South are more likely to engage in empirical and mixed-methods papers compared (...) to Global North authors in our sample. Moreover, a greater share of Global South authors engage in intersectional analysis and exhibit geographical focus on developing countries. Drawing insights from the Feminist Economics manuscripts data, we argue that encouraging Global South research can contribute to the goals of the field of feminist economics – aimed at inclusivity, diversity of standpoints, and plurality in research methods, thereby improving overall economic research. (shrink)

The truth-conditional theory of sense holds that a theory of truth for a natural language can serve as a theory of sense: if knowledge of a theory of truth for a language L is sufficient for understanding utterance of L-sentences, the T-sentences of the theory 'show' the sense of the uttered object-language sentences. In this paper I aim to show that indexicals create a serious problem for this prima facie attractive theoretical option. The so-called 'instantiation problem' is that a truth-theory (...) for indexical languages needs to contain universal statements that show how the reference of indexicals depends on features of the utterance context. Now one can deduce from such statements T-sentences that do not show the sense of an indexical sentence on an occasion of use. I survey proposed solutions to the instantiation problem by Evans and Sainsbury and, unfortunately, find them all wanting. Perhaps there is nothing like the sense-giving truth-condition for an indexical sentence. (shrink)

Volume 24, Issue 12, December 2024, Page 23-25.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:17~ BOOK REVIEWS sician, hiding the most important elements of his thought in obscure passages, burying the central concepts of his theory of language, and offering a sly double entendre (l\foDonough's reading of T 7) without giving the reader the slightest clue. But McDonough's account does not persuade; so we are not obligated to make this reassessment. JOHN CHURCHILL Hendrix College Conway, Arkansas The Nature and Limits of (...) Authority. By RIOHARD T. DEGEORGE. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1985. Pp. 305 with index. Richard DeGeorge has produced a very thorough analysis of the nature and limits of authority in general as well as of authority in such specific domains as the family, political society, the labor place, religious bodies, the domain of knowledge in general (epistemic: authority in general), and the university. DeGeorge draws some very useful distinctions among different kinds of authority. His working model is: "someone or something (X) is an authority if he (she, it) stands in relation to someone else (Y) as superior stands to inferior with respect to some realm, field or domain (R) " (14). On his analysis authority is sometimes a power and sometimes a right. He divides authority most basically into executive authority and nonexecutive authority. Executive authority is the right or power of someone to do something in some domain. Nonexecutive authority, on the other hand, concerns knowledge or example. Nonexecutive authority can be epistemic or exemplary (i.e., the authority of one who sets an example to follow, as in art or morality). DeGeorge discusses all of these with patience and clarity. DeGeorge's justification for epistemic authority is that: 1) people are not equal in knowledge (or competence), and 2) the reliance on epistemic authority allows many more people to benefit from some people's knowledge than just those who directly know (38). There are criteria by which rational acceptance of epistemic authority can be distinguished from irrational acceptance. For example, Y must have good reason for believing that X has knowledge in the relevant domain. DeGeorge takes seriously the challenge of anarchism, discussing in some detail arguments by Bakunin, Marx, and Robert Paul Wolff as examples. DeGeorge defines various types of freedom and concludes that, pace the anarchists, the exercises of various kinds of authority, and, in particular, BOOK REVIEWS 173 of political authority, can enhance, rather than limit, free choice and "teleological freedom" (i.e., the ability of persons to conceive of and to attain their goals). Thus he justifies political authority, not on the basis of consent, but on the basis of its necessity in order to preserve and increase effective teleological freedom. Consent is not the foundation for political authority's legitimacy, but, if I understand DeGeorge correctly, a necessary condition of its legitimacy. DeGeorge argues that there is no such thing as executive moral authority. That is, there is no one who makes something morally right simply by commanding it. In another chapter he distinguishes among various kind of religious authority: delegated divine authority (e.g., to preserve revealed truths handed down), operative authority within the church organization (i.e., authority to represent or act for the church body, and religious epistemic authority. In a very enlightening chapter on university and authority, DeGeorge defends the value, both intrinsic and instrumental to all of society, of what he calls the objective-knowledge university. " The objective-knowledge university has as its primary end the traditional trio of discovering, preserving, and transmitting objective, systematic, and unified knowledge " (251). DeGeorge often takes a very non-dialectical approach, which sometimes inadvertently hides how controversial some of the issues are and how significant the positions are which he calmly sets out. The book is extremely thorough; it brings analytic clarity to issues on which there has been surprisingly little philosophical work done. It should be consulted by anyone doing philosophical or theological work on any of the several topics that demand clear thinking about the nature of authority. Center for Thomistic Studies University of St. Thomas Houston, Texas PATRICK LEE... (shrink)

Violations and biases relative to normative principles of rationality tend to occur when the structure of task environments is novel or the decision goals are in conflict. The two blades of bounded rationality, the structure of task environments and the computational capacities of the actor, can sharpen the conceptual distinctions between the sources of the normative and descriptive gap.

Intentional change when viewed as making a risky or intertemporal choice with evolutionary relevance helps us understand its successes and its failures. To promote future-oriented ecological rationality requires establishing a linkage between nongenetic, cultural, and symbolic selections and genetic adaptations. Coupled with biophilic instinct, intentional conservation is more likely to prevail against evolved desires of environmental exploitation.

The smartness of simple heuristics depends upon their fit to the structure of task environments. Being fast and frugal becomes psychologically demanding when a decision goal is bounded by the risk distribution in a task environment. The lack of clear goals and prioritized cues in a decision problem may lead to the use of simple but irrational heuristics. Future research should focus more on how people use and integrate simple heuristics in the face of goal conflict under risk.

Campbell's target article is a stimulating attempt to extend our understanding of sex differences in risk-taking behaviors. However, Campbell does not succeed in demonstrating that her account adds explanatory power to those (e.g., Daly & Wilson 1994) previously proposed. In particular, little effort was made to explore the causal links between survival (staying alive) and reproduction.

We agree with Ainslie's general approach to intertemporal choices and self-control. However, we argue that a concept of “will” is superfluous in explaining tradeoffs between SS (smaller and sooner) and LL (larger and later) rewards in a framework of temporal goal setting and goal aggregation. We provide an alternative framework of reference point-dependent tradeoffs between SS and LL options.

Psychiatry is rapidly adopting digital phenotyping and artificial intelligence/machine learning tools to study mental illness based on tracking participants’ locations, online activity, phone and text message usage, heart rate, sleep, physical activity, and more. Existing ethical frameworks for return of individual research results (IRRs) are inadequate to guide researchers for when, if, and how to return this unprecedented number of potentially sensitive results about each participant’s real-world behavior. To address this gap, we convened an interdisciplinary expert working group, supported by (...) a National Institute of Mental Health grant. Building on established guidelines and the emerging norm of returning results in participant-centered research, we present a novel framework specific to the ethical, legal, and social implications of returning IRRs in digital phenotyping research. Our framework offers researchers, clinicians, and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) urgently needed guidance, and the principles developed here in the context of psychiatry will be readily adaptable to other therapeutic areas. (shrink)

War Machines: Transforming Technologies in the U.S. Military, 1920–1940, is not as broad as its title might suggest. Timothy Moy does indeed propose a broad thesis, that institutional culture plays a large, though seldom acknowledged, role in technological innovation. But he addresses only two very particular case studies of military innovation between the world wars. The longer reviews the Army Air Force's development of the technology for precision bombing; the shorter examines the U.S. Marine Corps's development of the technology for (...) amphibious assault. What primarily shaped these innovations were, in Moy's view, the particular cultures of the air force and marines and their internal politics rather than the more commonly cited technical or industrial imperatives.The book is divided into two parts, each of four chapters, plus an introduction and a conclusion . As we might expect of a study derived from a Berkeley history of science dissertation, War Machines rests on a reasonably solid research base. The two stories are told separately, however, and differ significantly in both structure and documentation. Part 1, “Precision Bombing,” alternates chapters on doctrine and technology. Chapters 2 and 4 follow the air force adoption of strategic bombing as a mission to win independence from the army. Judging by the endnotes, both chapters rest chiefly on secondary sources and are less analytical than assertive. Chapters 3 and 5 trace the air force effort to find the bombsights and bombers that its self‐chosen mission required. These chapters offer a more extensively documented and persuasive narrative than those on doctrine, although the two are not very well integrated. Part 2, “Amphibious Landing,” in contrast, integrates doctrine, training, and technology in a single narrative. It begins with the marines adopting advanced base defense and amphibious warfare to define missions that would sustain institutional independence, then follows the interaction of doctrinal evolution, training exercises, and technological development. These chapters are based much more heavily on archival research than those in Part 1.Moy is a fine writer, but he sometimes lapses into phrasemaking at the expense of explanation. Referring to the air force as a “high‐tech” organization, for instance, he claims that “the airmen's institutional self‐image as futuristic and gallant knights of the sky shaped the vision of strategic bombing they articulated and embraced. Daylight bombing grew out of this high‐tech culture” . How bombing squares with a “knights of the sky” self‐image he never explains. Nor does he ever fully address the specifics of one of his major categories, high‐tech versus low‐tech innovation. This becomes all the more troublesome when he extends the distinction by characterizing the air force as high tech, the marines as low tech. Quite apart from the anachronistic usage, this contrast tends to become more label than analysis.However well chosen Moy's cases, two seems a slender base to sustain his thesis. One feature of his argument that I find particularly problematic is the almost complete absence of internal opposition. Neither airmen nor marines spoke with one voice about the choice of a single mission to define their service. Moy mentions the advocates of pursuit aviation only in passing, for instance, and is completely silent about any dissidence among marines. This places him in the company of a long line of historians and social scientists who have studied controversies over military innovation exclusively from the viewpoint of those perceived to be on the winning side. In his conclusion Moy does briefly discuss the alternatives each service might have chosen; but however well done, it is too little and too late. (shrink)

Based on the institutional theory, this article attempts to examine two consecutive questions regarding the impact of various factors on corporate decision in environmental information disclosure (EID): (1) whether or not to disclose; and (2) the level of disclosure. The relevance of these factors is empirically tested using data collected from publicly listed manufacturing companies from 2006 to 2008 in China. Some interesting findings appear. We find that firms that are state-owned, those that operate in environmentally sensitive industries, those having (...) more industrial peers engaged in EID, and those with better reputation are more likely to disclose environmental information. When it comes to the content of EID, variables that attempt to capture external institutional pressures exhibit either no or weak explanatory power. Only the variable of organizational image and reputation is demonstrated to have a significant impact on both the act and the content of EID. This study provides a snapshot of the dialogues between constituencies in the organizational field and EID development. (shrink)

The research about strategic human resource management (SHRM) has suggested that human resource professionals (HRPs) have the opportunity to play a greater role in contributing to organizational success if they are effective in developing systems and policies aligned with the organization's values, goals, and mission. We suggest that HRPs need to raise the standard of their performance and that the competitive demands of the modern economic environment create implicit ethical duties that HRPs owe to their organizations. We define ethical stewardship (...) as a model of governance that honors obligations due to the many stakeholders and that maximizes long-term organizational wealth creation. We propose that if HRPs adopt an ethical stewardship framework and the qualities of transformative leaders, they will be more aware of their ethical duties to their organizations and more effective in helping their organizations to create increased wealth, achieve desired organizational outcomes, and establish work environments that are more satisfying to employees. (shrink)

Clicking the like button following a post on social media has become a common means of expressing and gathering social support online. Little is known about how liking expression is linked and regulated by personality traits and communication motives. Following a preliminary survey about the usage of the like function on WeChat, a Chinese social media platform, we conducted an online study to map the Big-Five personality traits and five communication motives to the frequency of liking expression. The results showed (...) that each user had, on average, 385 WeChat friends and spent 2.2 hours and used the liking function 1.1 times each day on WeChat. The personality trait conscientiousness was negatively related to the liking expression. In contrast, agreeableness promoted the expression of liking directly and indirectly via two communication motives, enjoyment and passing time. The liking expression may serve as a simple index for understanding dispositional underpinnings of social media networking. (shrink)